Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) have been argued to be afflicted with incentiveincompatibility problems and, indeed, they have a mixed record in their ability to curb market abuse. An earlier theoretical study by DeMarzo et al. (2005) , however, finds that SROs, under the oversight of the government, may overcome these incentive-incompatibility problems and may deliver the same degree of oversight as the government would have delivered without the SRO, but against lower costs. I find that this result hinges on the assumption that the interaction between the SRO and the government can be characterized as a game of sequential moves with the SRO moving first and the government moving second. For institutional settings where it is more appropriate to characterize the interaction as a game of simultaneous moves, I obtain the inefficient result that oversight by the government fully crowds out oversight by the SRO. I also perform an experimental test, which corroborates the predictions of the model. A possible remedy is suggested. 8 The transaction fees are needed to cover the expected investigationl. While it may be surprising that customers may potentially pay a fee for the GOV and the SRO, the GOV never repeats an investigation done by the SRO, so wasteful duplication is avoided. Moreover, we will see that, in equilibrium, only one regulator does all investigations and the customer then pays a positive fee to this regulator only. 9 This assumption could be rationalized assuming that the low outcome is reported both to the SRO and the GOV, but that the SRO is quicker to react than the GOV. This is not unreasonable, as governmental, bureaucratic organizations are often much slower than private ones. Moreover, it is rational for the GOV to move slower and give the SRO a chance to do the investigation first as the SRO has lower investigation costs. Alternatively, assuming that the GOV moves first does not change the results. VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH NONE VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH Other Base, 6x6, GOV]
INTRODUCTION 1
Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) can be found in not-for-profit sectors, education, healthcare, and the energy industry, as well as in the accounting, financial, and legal professions (DeMarzo et al., 2005; Hilary and Lennox, 2005; Maute, 2008; Ortmann and Mysliveček, 2010; Ortmann and Svitkova, 2010; Rees, 1997; Sidel, 2005; Studdert et al., 2004; Welch, Mazur and Bretschneider, 2000) . Generally, regulatory oversight by an SRO is considered cheaper than regulatory oversight by the government, as SROs have more information and are better enabled to interpret the information (DeMarzo et al., 2005) .
Examples of SROs are the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority in the securities industry (DeMarzo et al., 2005) , the so-called Donors Forums in not-for-profit sectors in Central and Eastern Europe (Ortmann and Svitkova, 2010) , and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations in the nuclear power industry (Rees, 1997) . DeMarzo et al. (2005) present an influential model of regulatory oversight by a regulator (which can be an SRO or the government) over an interaction between a customer (he) and an agent (she) using the costly-state-verification model of Townsend (1979) , Border and Sobel (1987) , and Mookherjee and Png (1989) . 2 In these models, the agent provides a service that is, on average, wealth-increasing, but can have a low or a high outcome. The outcome is private knowledge of the agent and an opportunistic agent may thus have an incentive to deceive a customer by reporting a low outcome when it is in fact high and keep the pay-off difference herself. The agent thus needs to be incentivized to be honest and DeMarzo et al. (2005) show that both a "whip" and a "carrot" may be used for this purpose. The regulator performs random investigations when the agent reports a low outcome and gives a financial penalty when the agent is found to have deceived a customer (the whip) and the customer gives the agent a bonus in the form of a success fee when the agent reports a high outcome (the carrot).
The regulatory regime can thus be modeled as the probability (referred to as the "investigation probability") with which the regulator investigates reports of the low outcome. When customers and agents make contracts, they take into account the regulatory regime. DeMarzo et al. (2005) thus model the oversight as a two-tier problem in which the regulators (the SRO and the government) determine the investigation policy taking into account the effect of that policy on the contracts that are subsequently created by the customer and agent. The two key differences between the SRO and the government are investigation costs and the target group for which to maximize utility. Investigations done by the SRO are cheaper than those by the government and the target group is customers for the government and agents for the SRO. DeMarzo et al. (2005) show that, as investigations are costly, the profit-maximizing investigation probability is generally, both for the SRO and the government, smaller than 100%. They also show that, as a result of the two key differences between the SRO and the government, the optimal regulatory regime of the government generally consists of a different (higher) investigation probability than the one of the SRO. DeMarzo et al. (2005) further show that, without governmental oversight, the SRO can create monopoly market power for their affiliated agents by setting the investigation probability very low, but that with governmental oversight, the SRO sets the investigation probability at the (relatively high) level deemed optimal by the government, thus eliminating the need for the government to do any investigations. In other words, the mere outside threat of governmental oversight suffices to have the SRO make a welfare-increasing contribution by performing oversight at a relatively high level against relatively low costs, rebutting earlier criticisms (e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1981; Nunez 2001 Nunez , 2007 Ortmann and Mysliveček, 2010) . DeMarzo et al. (2005) obtain the results of a welfare-increasing effect of an SRO by modeling the interaction between the SRO and the government as a one-shot sequential game where the SRO moves first and the government moves second. Modeling the interaction as a sequential game rests on the assumption that the government, when choosing its regulatory regime by setting its investigation probability, already knows the regulatory regime of the SRO. A regulatory regime is, however, enacted over a future period -for example, over a period of one year -and the factually implemented regulatory regime can be different from the originally announced regulatory regime. Whether the factually implemented regulatory regime is the same as the announced one can only be verified in the end of a period after the fact. When the SRO is not obliged to make a true announcement, there is thus no reason to assume that the government, when setting its investigation probability, can know the factual regulatory regime of the SRO. The SRO may announce or signal its intended regulatory regime to the government, but I will show that, absent additional sanction mechanisms, the SRO has an incentive to deceive the government by signaling a high investigation probability, but factually implementing a lower one. 3 It can therefore be argued that when the government chooses its investigation probability, it does not know the investigation probability of the SRO, and visa versa. The interaction between the SRO and the government is thus best characterized as a game of simultaneous moves.
In this paper, I analyze the interaction of the government and the SRO as a one-shot simultaneous game and derive the unique Nash equilibrium under fairly general assumptions.
To isolate and highlight the effect of the game structure, I use the same assumptions and game structure as in the model of DeMarzo et al. (2005) with the single exception that the game structure has simultaneous instead of sequential moves. 4 I show that the Nash equilibrium outcome of the simultaneous game, in contrast with the one of the sequential game, is Paretoinefficient: The government does all investigations and the SRO none. The welfare-improving effect of the SRO in DeMarzo et al. (2005) is thus critically dependent on the assumption that the interaction between the SRO and the government can be characterized as a sequential game. The proof is presented in section 2. Section 3 presents a numeric example, section 4 presents experimental evidence and section 5 concludes with a discussion of the results and a policy-relevant implication for regulation.
THE MODEL

Setup
As in DeMarzo et al. (2005) , the main interaction in the model is between an SRO and the government (GOV). It is common knowledge that the SRO maximizes the total utility of all agents and the GOV maximizes the total utility of all customers. An agent (she) affiliated with an SRO provides a service for a customer (he), such as making an investment. ) when the outcome is low (high). The customer offers the contract as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent. Without loss of generality (using the revelation theorem), the analysis can be restricted to contracts that are incentivecompatible and agents thus, in equilibrium, accept the contract.
Two polar cases for the regulatory environment are of particular interest: When only the GOV is exerting regulatory oversight (also referred to as "GOV-only") and when only the SRO is exerting regulatory oversight (also referred to as "SRO-only"). DeMarzo et al. (2005) show that the SRO under SRO-only sets its investigation probability inefficiently low, leaving the "stick" in the form of financial penalties mostly ineffective as an incentive for the agent to report truthfully. As a result the customer is forced to use "carrots": He must offer the agent a large proportion of the outcome as a success fee to incentivize her to report truthfully. When customers are homogeneous in their outside options, the SRO will set its investigation probability so low that the necessary success fee will extract all the surplus of the investment, thus leaving customers with an expected utility equal to their outside option. When customers are heterogeneous in their outside options, a low investigation probability may dissuade customers with high outside options from entering. The SRO therefore sets an investigation probability that maximizes the product of the expected fee and the number of customers that will participate. Customers with low outside options will now keep some of the surplus, but, from a welfare point of view, the resulting outcome is undesirable.
By also exerting oversight, the GOV can affect the SRO's optimal investigation probability, provided the investigation cost of the GOV is not too much higher than the one of the SRO. Namely, as the expected investigation cost is borne by the customer, the higher the GOV investigation cost, the lower the optimal GOV investigation probability. For extremely high cost differentials between the GOV and the SRO, the investigation probability set by the GOV under GOV-only is lower than the investigation probability set by the SRO under SROonly. For such a high cost differential, oversight by the GOV in addition to oversight by the SRO is ineffective as it would decrease the welfare of customers and the GOV thus refrains from exercising oversight. As in DeMarzo et al. (2005) , I assume that the cost differential is small enough to make oversight by the GOV effective. 6 1 ), the GOV sets, as in the present model, an investigation probability at the same time as the SRO (a simultaneous move) or, as in DeMarzo et al. (2005) , after as the SRO (a sequential move). Table 1 shows the timing and order of moves, both for the present model (on the left) and the model of DeMarzo et al. (2005) (on the right).
Prime decision makers
In stage 1, the GOV and the SRO set their investigation probability simultaneously in the present model, while they set it sequentially in the model of DeMarzo et al. (2005) . The remaining stages are identical for both models.
In stage 2, customers can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer of an incentive-compatible assumed to be log-concave, gives the fraction of customers with an outside option below a .
There are at least as many (identical) agents as customers, such that for each customer i an agent (indexed by i) is available for dealing. The profit of the contract, a, is the same for all customers (it is equal to the expected value of the investment minus the expected success fee minus the expected investigation costs of the SRO and GOV). A customer will only offer a contract to an agent when the contract brings him an expected profit higher than his outside option. The profit of the customer is thus equal to the maximum of his outside option and the 10 The total probability of an investigation when the low outcome occurs is thus equal to the probability of the profit of the contract. Let the outside option of a customer be given by i a . The profit of the contract, a, and the customer's final profit, i customer u , are given by:
(1)
Max a a = The customer thus maximizes his profit i customer u by maximizing a as given in Equation (1) by choosing a contract z, respecting the restrictions that the contract must be feasible and incentive-compatible for the agent. Thus, the customer maximizes the consumer problem (CP)
in Table 2 . The constraint AF assures that the contract is feasible and the constraint AIC assures that the contract is incentive-compatible for the agent. As the offered contracts are incentive-compatible, agents accept the contracts and report the realized outcomes truthfully.
The expected utility of agent i (who is matched with a customer with outside option i a ) is equal to the expectation of the utility of the success fees if the utility for the customer is higher than his outside option and zero otherwise:
Pay-offs of the SRO and the GOV
As mentioned above, the SRO has a pay-off equal to the total utility of all agents and the GOV has a pay-off equal to the total of profits of all customers. The pay-offs of the SRO and the GOV are therefore:
Lemma 1 in Appendix A1 shows that the maximization problems of the SRO and the GOV can be represented by SROP and GOVP in Table 2 .
The customer, the SRO and the GOV problems ]
d) The best response function of the GOV is given by
Proofs. See the Appendix. GOV BR , and while the GOV prefers the oversight to be done by the SRO, the GOV is willing to provide any necessary level of oversight to make up a shortfall. Figure 1 ), it has, for the GOV, a slope of -1, and, for the SRO, a slope lower than -1.
Best response functions of the GOV and the SRO In GOV BR , and the GOV sets its investigation probability equal to zero. I will now prove in Proposition 1 that the only Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game is an action profile where the GOV does all investigations and the SRO does none (point 1 in Figure 1 ). (2005) showed that this outcome is suboptimal not only from the viewpoint of the GOV, but also from the viewpoint of the SRO. Thus if the SRO could make an announcement before the setting of the investigation probabilities and commit itself credibly to this announcement, it would announce and implement
. Proposition 1b, however, shows that the SRO has the incentive to make a false announcement: The SRO would announce investigation
When the GOV is not gullible, the GOV therefore disregards the SRO's announcement as cheap talk and the interaction between GOV and SRO is best characterized as one of simultaneous moves.
As the SRO does no investigations, the investigation probability of the GOV is given by
The solution has earlier been presented in DeMarzo et al. (2005) 12 and I present it here, for completeness, as Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game, the GOV sets its investigation probability given by
Proof. See the Appendix.
Success fee
Investigation probability p 0% 100% , the assumption that oversight by the GOV is effective is thus fulfilled. 13 Using the values zero ("NONE"),
[0] 0.32 S BR = ("LOW") and
[0] 0.67 G BR = ("HIGH"), a 3x3 matrix game can be generated with the payoffs for the SRO and the GOV (divided by 100) in each of the cells. Table 6 shows the 3x3 matrix game. (2013) same magnitude as GOV payoffs in equilibrium. As the multiplication by m>0 is a monotonic transformation of the utility function, preferences are invariant for different positive values of m. Table 7 gives the baseline parameterization and the three key variables in bold typeface.
GOV
Agent (A)
Client ( Notes: The Nash-Equilibrium -explained below--is indicated by "*". Adapted from Van Koten and Ortmann (2013) TABLE 8
Overview of parameterizations
From the set-up in Table 7 were created the 8 parameterizations shown in Table 8 , using the structure of the game and assuming the optimal responses of agents and clients. 15 The payoff matrixes reflect subjects in the roles of SRO and GOV choosing selected monitoring probabilities. Subjects were presented with the payoff matrixes to capture the common knowledge assumption. As evidenced by the two sets of four cost differentials (one for LOW success probability in the left column, one for HIGH success probability in the right column), 15 Option "None" is equal to an SRO investigation probability of zero. Option "Low" is equal to the investigation probability that the SRO will set when left to its own devices, * S p . Option "High" is equal to the investigation probability that GOV will set if SRO sets an investigation probability of zero,
The investigation probabilities "Low" and "High" are thus slightly different for the different cost differentials and success probabilities. "Low" varies between 30% and 37% and "High" between 54% and 94%. the investigation costs of GOV and SRO do not have very large effects, while the success probability induces considerable variability and increases the payoff contrast between the preferred outcomes. 16 For the experimental treatments I focus on the parameterization with the lesser payoff contrast: the 5 th parameterization, referred to as "Baseline" and use the parameterization with the higher payoff contrast, the 6 th parameterization (referred to as "Alternative"), for a robustness test.
The overall design Baseline
Robustness test 1:
Alternative parameterization
Robustness test 2:
Complex (6x6) 3x3 game 6x6 game
FIGURE 3
Summary of the treatments Parameterization 5, as discussed in the previous sections, is the main (Baseline) treatment.
This parameterization is referred to in the box labeled "Baseline" in the summary of treatments in Figure 3 . Also, two robustness tests were done. As a first robustness test ("Alternative parameterization"), a treatment that uses parameterization 6 ("Alternative") in Presenting the normal-form game to participants in a complex format Table 9 gives an overview of the sessions. A total of 6 sessions were run in December 2011 in the "LEE" experimental lab of the University of Economics in Prague. 18 In each session 24 participants made decisions, as SRO or GOV, over 10 rounds. Following welldocumented experimental practice, participants in each session were divided into 4 groups of 6 to increase the number of truly independent data points. In each group, 3 participants were randomly assigned the role of GOV and 3 the role of SRO. Roles were fixed throughout the session. In each round, participants were randomly matched with a participant of the other role within their group. Each session thus resulted in 4 (24÷6) independent observations. In total 6 sessions were run, involving 144 participants and generating 24 independent data points. Participants in the role of SRO and participants in the role of GOV made their choices simultaneously. Neutral language was used in the instructions (reprinted in Appendix A4), 17 Option "None" is equal to an investigation probability of zero. The investigation probability is then increased by 16.67% for each of the successive options. Thus, the option "Very Low" is equal to an investigation probability of 16.67%, the option "Low" to one of 33.33%, the option "Medium" to one of 50%, and so on. 18 Proportion of Nash equilibrium choices Figure 5a shows, for the Baseline treatment, the proportion of choices that are congruent with a Nash equilibrium, both for the individual (the solid circles) and the paired choices (the empty circles). Initially, individual choices are far off from Nash equilibrium. Typically in less than half the cases an individual makes a Nash equilibrium choice in the first three periods. We see, however, a remarkable learning effect. In the last few rounds paired choices are in the range of 60%-80%. The paired choices (the solid circles in Figure 5a have mainly the same shapes as those for the individual choices, while the percentages are lower. The lower percentages are expected as a paired choice is a part of a Nash equilibrium only if both of the individual choices in a pair are a part of a Nash equilibrium. Figure 5b shows the proportion of individual choices that are congruent with a Nash equilibrium in the robustness tests (the use of a alternative parameterization and a more complex format, 6 by 6 instead of 3 by 3). The choices for the baseline treatment are indicated by the thick line with the large round markers. The choices for the treatments of the robustness tests are indicated by the thin lines with the empty triangles and diamonds. The proportion of equilibrium choices in the Alternative Parameterization treatments ("Alternative") is higher initially and converges faster to full equilibrium play than the corresponding percentage in the Baseline. This is likely the result of the stronger contrast in payoffs for SRO and GOV in the Alternative parameterization. Recall that the Alternative parameterization has a stronger contrast because it has a higher success probability than the baseline (50% versus 25% success probability). The choices for the Complex treatment are very much in line with the Baseline treatment. I conclude that the results corroborate the model and that the results are robust to a different parameterization and a considerable increase in complexity (from 3 to 6 choices for each participant). et al. (2005) reported that adding governmental oversight may increase the oversight activity of the SRO to an efficient level. This study adds an important qualification:
CONCLUSION
DeMarzo
When the interaction between an SRO and a government is best described as one of simultaneous moves, then the oversight by the government completely crowds out the oversight by the SRO and the SRO becomes superfluous. This outcome is Pareto-inefficient as the government has a higher cost of investigation than the SRO. The result is of importance since many industries have been trying to rely on self-regulation. DeMarzo et al. (2005) assert that the interaction between the SRO and government can be characterized as sequential moves as the SRO can announce its investigation probability to the government and so become a first mover. However, the announced investigation probability may be different from the investigation probability that is factually implemented. Proposition 1b) showed that the SRO has indeed the incentive to deceive the government by announcing a high investigation probability but implementing a lower one. Assuming that the government is not gullible, the government will disregarded the SRO's announcement as an uninformative signal. This makes the interaction between the SRO and government one of simultaneous moves, resulting in the inefficient outcome as derived in this paper.
I experimentally tested the model and I find, for specific parameterizations and implementation details that the predictions of the model are being borne out. As the two performed robustness tests show, the results are robust to a different parameterization and a more complex decision format.
It may be worthwhile considering what institutional design elements could transform the interaction between the SRO and the government into one of sequential moves. Namely, if the SRO could credibly commit to its announced investigation probability, then the government could trust the announcement and condition its choice on the announcement. This would transform the interaction between the SRO and the government into one of sequential moves, resulting in the efficient outcome as derived in DeMarzo et al. (2005) . As the inefficient outcome is also suboptimal from the viewpoint of the SRO, the SRO could be expected to actively promote implementing institutional design changes that enable the SRO to credibly commit to its announcement.
An example of a design element that could make the announcement of the SRO credible is the addition of another tier of regulation. This could be a relatively light-handed form of regulation, focused on forcing the SRO to make a clear and precise regulatory regime announcement and to implement its announced regulatory regime. For example, the government could oversee the SRO, require it to announce an regulatory regime in the form of a precise numeric investigation probability, monitor the proportion of complaints that are investigated by the SRO and severely sanction the SRO when it underperforms. (A1) is obtained using the fact that customers, if their outside option is larger than a , will not deal with the agent, resulting in zero income for the agent. Equation (A2) is obtained using that the optimal conditional agent utility is the same for all customers with an outside option lower than a and [ ] V a can thus be taken outside of the integration. As a result: 
GOV GOV GOV p x . The resulting optimal parameters must also solve CP (CIC) and
CIR.
Before giving a definition of the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, it is useful to first apply simplifications to the problems in Table 2 . Lemma 2 summarizes the regularities that can be used for a first simplification.
Lemma 2 
This experiment should take at most 60 minutes. There are 10 paid rounds in this experiment.
You are encouraged to write on these instructions and to highlight what you deem particularly relevant information.
[Please go to the next page now.]
Group assignment
You will always be a member of a group consisting of you and ONE other person in this room. Group membership is anonymous; you will not know who is in a group with you and the other person in your group will not know that you are in his or her group. Group membership is assigned anew in each round, in a random way.
You will be asked to make a series of interactive decisions in this experiment, i.e. your earnings in each round will depend both on your decision and that of the person that you are paired with for that round.
In each group one participant will be of Type 1 and the other one will be of Type 2.
You will not know beforehand what the other participant chooses and the other participant will not know beforehand what you choose.
The roles of Type 1 and Type 2 are randomly assigned at the beginning of the experiment and remain the same throughout the experiment. Once the experiment starts, you will see whether you are Type 1 or Type 2 on your screen in the upper left corner. Below it you can also see the round. For an example, see Figure 1 . Figure 1 [Please turn over]
Decision Screen
In each round you will be presented with a Decision Screen where you will make a choice by clicking on one of the See the example in Figure 2 . You can see your possible earnings and the possible earnings of the participant assigned to you for that round in the Earnings Table on the paper with the title "YOUR EARNINGS  TABLE" which you find on your desk.
Your payoffs are in bolded black numbers on yellow background in the upper left corners of each cell of the Earnings Table. The payoffs of the participant assigned to you for that round are in blue numbers on a white background in the lower right corner of each square of the Earnings Table. To repeat, your earnings in each round will depend both on your choice and that of the person that is assigned to you for that round.
EXAMPLE BOX
In this EXAMPLE BOX we will explain how your choices and the choices of the participant that is assigned to you determine your earnings. The earnings of the participant that is assigned to you are determined in a similar manner, with their earnings shown in the lower right corner of each square of the Example Earnings Table. To make your choice you have one minute; if you have not made a choice during that time, the computer will assign you the choice of NONE. This is the standard procedure for all decisions in this experiment. You can see the time you have left to make a choice in the upper right corner of the screen ("Remaining time"), see Figure 3 for an example.
The Example Earnings
Figure 3
To repeat, you will not know beforehand what the other participant chooses and the other participant will not know beforehand what you choose .
After all participants have made their decisions, or if one minute has expired, the computer will calculate your earnings.
Results Screen
You will next see a Results Screen. The Results Screen will show your choice and the choice of the participant that is assigned to you for that round. The Results Screen will also show your and the other participants' earnings.
EXAMPLE BOX
In the example in Figure 3 you and the other participant chose NONE. In the example in Figure 3 your earnings are thus 5 and that of the other participant are 4 (to repeat: in the experiment a different Earnings Table will be used: the one on your desk with the title "YOUR EARNINGS TABLE").
You have one minute to inspect the outcomes. (This is the standard time you have for inspecting results). When you need less time to inspect the outcomes, then click the NEXT ROUND button. Once all participants have clicked the NEXT ROUND button, the experiment continues with the next round. Note that the Results Screen will be visible until all participants have clicked on the NEXT ROUND button. 
